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Abstract: Because of its environmental damage and now often being the most expensive source for
electricity production, coal use is declining throughout the United States. Michigan has no active
coal mining and seemingly supportive legislation for distributed generation (DG) and renewable
energy (RE) technologies. However, Michigan still derives approximately half of its power production
from large centralized coal plants, despite the availability of much lower cost RE DG technologies.
To understand this conundrum, this study reviews how Michigan investor owned utilities utilize their
political power to perpetuate utility structures that work toward the financial interests of the utilities
rather than the best interests of the state’s electricity consumers, including other firms and residents.
Background is provided covering the concept of DG, the cost savings associated with DG, and utility
regulatory regimes at the national, regional, state, and local levels. Recent case studies from specific
utility strategies are provided in order to illustrate how Michigan utilities manipulate regulatory
regimes via policy misinterpretation to deter or hinder the proliferation of DG in favor of maintaining
the existing interests in centralized, fossil fuel-based electrical energy production. The results of this
study demonstrate how DG proliferation is hindered by Michigan regulated utilities via the exercise
of political power within existing legal and regulatory regimes. This highlights the need to think
about how utilities may interpret and implement rules when designing energy legislation and policy
to maximize the benefits for consumers and society. Policy recommendations and alternate strategies
are provided to help enhance the role of energy policy to improve rather than limit the utilization of
RE DG.
Keywords: distributed generation; energy policy; renewable energy; electric utilities; utility regulation
1. Introduction
Nearly half of electrical generation in Michigan is provided by coal-fired electrical power plants
that are concentrated in the Lower Peninsula [1]. Although there are some coal resources underground
in Michigan, the state has no active coal mines [2]. This requires Michigan to import all of its fuel
for these coal-fired power plants, moving money out of the state [3]. Yet, Michigan has substantial
renewable energy (RE) resource potential in the form of biomass from an abundance of forestland
area [4], hydroelectric power along many rivers [5], as well as ample wind [6] and solar energy [7,8].
Modern solar photovoltaic (PV) [9] and wind energy [10] technologies provide a lower levelized cost of
electricity [11–13] than coal-fired electricity [14,15]. In addition, they can be inherently distributed (e.g.
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each electricity consumer produces some or all of their electricity on site). Distributed generation (DG)
has several technical advantages, including improved reliability and reduced transmission losses [16,
17]. RE resources in general and DG RE in particular increase access to more affordable and locally
(or even individually) owned energy systems, arguably a more socially just technological application
for the provision of electrical energy services [18–22]. Despite these benefits, Michigan’s RE profile
remains low [1] and some of Michigan’s residential electricity consumers are paying approximately
20% more for electricity than the United States (U.S.) averages [9]. To understand why Michigan
continues to use more expensive and less environmentally benign electricity generation technologies,
this study investigates the utility structures and regulatory regimes in Michigan. It explores how
existing utility entities in the state navigate the implementation of existing energy policy, finding
that policy interpretation and implementation serve to perpetuate the existing, fossil fuel dependent
energy regime.
As with other U.S. states, electrical energy is provided to Michigan’s customers by various utility
entities organized in three utility structures: (i) municipally owned entities, (ii) cooperative electric
associations, and (iii) investor owned utilities (IOUs). Municipal utilities and rural electric cooperatives
or rural electric associations are organized as public entities. IOUs, on the other hand, are private
and for-profit firms that provide electricity to 67% [23] of U.S. and 84% of Michigan customers [24].
As privately owned utility companies, IOUs must comply with regulatory measures that are set by
the state.
However, the implementation of regulatory measures involves interpretation. In the past,
Michigan utilities’ interpretation and implementation of existing federal and state energy laws
functioned to disincentivize DG proliferation, which limited the growth of RE deployment.
For example, Michigan maintains a Renewable Energy Standard (RES) that requires regulated utilities
to obtain 15% of electrical generation from renewables by 2021 [25]. A net metering program that
provides DG customers with credit for excess generation is within the RES; Michigan legislation
states that “An electric utility or alternative electric supplier is not required to allow for a distributed
generation program that is greater than 1% of its average in-state peak load for the preceding five
calendar years” [26]. Some IOUs operating in the state interpret this as a maximum and cap net
metering capacity to 1% of the peak generation load [27]. Michigan legislation also provides choice of
electric supplier to consumers, yet the legislation limits participation to 10% of the generation load [28].
These are just two examples of how utility interpretation and implementation of energy legislation
function to limit DG within the state of Michigan. As a result, the DG capacity of Michigan at the end
of 2017 was roughly 30 MW [29], totaling 10% of Michigan total energy usage [30].
The purpose of this study is to investigate how IOUs in Michigan utilize their political power
to perpetuate utility structures that work in the financial interests of the utilities rather than the best
interests of the state’s electricity consumers, including other firms and residents. Background is
provided covering the concept of DG, the cost savings associated with DG, and utility regulatory
regimes at the national, regional, state, and local levels. Recent case studies of specific utility strategies
are provided to illustrate how Michigan utilities use policy interpretation and implementation to deter
or hinder the proliferation of DG in favor of the maintenance of existing interests in centralized, fossil
fuel-based electrical energy production. Finally, policy recommendations and alternate strategies are
provided to help in enhancing the role of energy policy to improve rather than limit RE DG.
2. Background
This section begins with a brief description of DG including the cost savings associated with DG
for Michigan utility customers before turning to the Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC)
compliance requirements to the Michigan legislature regarding DG reporting. It then describes the
multilevel governance structures within which U.S. utilities operate. The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) oversees the wholesale electricity market along with the interstate transmission
of electricity. Public Service Commissions (PSC), which are also known as Public Utility Commissions
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(PUC), regulate the retail rates of utilities within each state. Different utility types are regulated
differently in each state; this section describes utility regulation only as specifically applicable
in Michigan.
2.1. What is Distributed Generation?
Distributed generation refers to technology that generates electricity at or near where it will be
used [31–33]. DG has different scales and applications, including a residence [34,35], a business [31],
or a larger system [36] operating as a microgrid for resilience or security [37]. Utility scale energy
generation, by contrast, and regardless of energy source, involves much larger systems, which are
often located further away from the site of use, which are owned and operated by or for utility
needs first. DG can be powered with RE sources, such as solar [31], wind [32], and hydro [38],
as well as other conventional fuels, such as diesel-powered [39] generators and various hybrid
arrangements of multiple sources [34,40]. This paper specifically focuses on DG from RE sources for
their ability to promote locally owned and operated energy systems as well as the improvement of
electrical grid operations by decreasing load and stress on transmission and distribution lines [41–45].
The environmental benefits of RE production as an alternative to conventional fossil fuels are also well
established [19–21], such as reduced pollution [46], lower rates of morbidity and mortality from air
pollution [47], and lessened environmental degradation [48].
On average, Michigan residential consumers pay $0.1512/kWh for electricity [9]. In order to show
that DG technologies, particularly solar PV, can provide electricity savings to residential customers
in almost all Michigan counties, the following analysis was conducted. A state of Michigan county
shapefile was obtained from the GIS Open Data database [49]. The electricity rates for each IOU were
obtained from the Michigan Public Service Commission bank of electric rate books [50]. Potential
savings for each county were calculated using the levelized cost of energy following the method
outlined by Branker et al. [11] from the electric rates using the following assumptions: inputting
average sun hours/county, an average 5 kW solar residential system capacity, and average $/W cost
of $2.50/W (The PV $/W cost was obtained through personal communication with solar development
firms in Michigan, including Chart House Energy, LLC, Quality Solar, and Strawberry Solar. The value
used is the average of PV suppliers and it does not include any tax credit). In addition, the LCOE is
based on average annual sun hours between 3.4 and 4.4 kWh/m2/day in each county, the capacity
factor calculated from sun hours, inverter replacement period of 10 years, PV system warranty of
30 years, solar PV system degradation rate of 0.5% per year, and 3.0% annual discount rate for
present-value calculations. Subsequently, the savings were calculated by subtracting the solar LCOE
from the IOU rates then geolocated onto each Michigan county utilizing ArcMap version 10.6.1. Table 1
breaks down each county by IOU residential rates, LCOE, sun hours [51], and the PV savings per
kWh. The average monthly savings of a residential consumer that utilizes 600 kWh/month is shown
in Figure 1. It is important to note that most counties contain municipal, electric cooperative, and IOUs.
As this paper specifically focuses on IOU strategies to hinder DG proliferation, that is the utility type
reflected in both Table 1 and Figure 1. It should also be pointed out that no incentives of any kind
were assumed (e.g. current 30% federal investment tax credit), so the PV savings are an extremely
conservative estimate.
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Table 1. Michigan County solar photovoltaic (PV) savings for residential systems breakdown per kWh.
County Utility Solar Flux(kW/m2/day)
PV LCOE
$/kWh
Residential
Rates $/kWh
PV Savings
$/kWh
Alcona Consumers Energy 3.75 $0.109 $0.162 $0.052
Alger Upper Peninsula PowerCo (UPPCo) 3.57 $0.115 $0.185 $0.070
Allegan Consumers Energy 3.80 $0.108 $0.162 $0.054
Alpena Alpena Power Co. 3.71 $0.110 $0.133 $0.023
Antrim Consumers Energy 3.65 $0.112 $0.162 $0.049
Arenac Consumers Energy 3.79 $0.108 $0.162 $0.054
Baraga UPPCo 3.62 $0.113 $0.185 $0.072
Barry Consumers Energy 3.79 $0.108 $0.162 $0.054
Bay Consumers Energy 3.78 $0.108 $0.162 $0.054
Benzie Consumers Energy 3.74 $0.109 $0.162 $0.052
Berrien Indiana Michigan Power(IMP) 3.79 $0.108 $0.125 $0.017
Branch Consumers Energy 3.81 $0.107 $0.162 $0.054
Calhoun Consumers Energy 3.81 $0.107 $0.162 $0.054
Cass IMP 3.82 $0.107 $0.125 $0.018
Charlevoix Consumers Energy 3.68 $0.111 $0.162 $0.051
Cheboygan Consumers Energy 3.68 $0.111 $0.162 $0.051
Chippewa non-IOU 3.66 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000
Clare Consumers Energy 3.73 $0.110 $0.162 $0.052
Clinton Consumers Energy 3.79 $0.108 $0.162 $0.054
Crawford Consumers Energy 3.70 $0.111 $0.162 $0.051
Delta UPPCo 3.70 $0.111 $0.185 $0.074
Dickinson UMERC 3.69 $0.111 $0.138 $0.027
Eaton Consumers Energy 3.80 $0.108 $0.162 $0.054
Emmet Consumers Energy 3.66 $0.112 $0.162 $0.049
Genesee Consumers Energy 3.79 $0.108 $0.162 $0.054
Gladwin Consumers Energy 3.76 $0.109 $0.162 $0.052
Gogebic Xcel 3.65 $0.112 $0.115 $0.003
Grand Traverse Consumers Energy 3.69 $0.111 $0.162 $0.051
Gratiot Consumers Energy 3.78 $0.108 $0.162 $0.054
Hillsdale Consumers Energy 3.82 $0.107 $0.162 $0.054
Houghton UPPCo 3.64 $0.112 $0.185 $0.073
Huron DTE 3.73 $0.110 $0.133 $0.023
Ingham Consumers Energy 3.80 $0.108 $0.162 $0.054
Ionia Consumers Energy 3.78 $0.108 $0.162 $0.054
Iosco Consumers Energy 3.77 $0.109 $0.162 $0.052
Iron UMERC 3.67 $0.112 $0.138 $0.026
Isabella Consumers Energy 3.76 $0.109 $0.162 $0.052
Jackson Consumers Energy 3.81 $0.107 $0.162 $0.054
Kalamazoo Consumers Energy 3.81 $0.107 $0.162 $0.054
Kalkaska Consumers Energy 3.67 $0.112 $0.162 $0.049
Kent Consumers Energy 3.78 $0.108 $0.162 $0.054
Keweenaw UPPCo 3.63 $0.113 $0.185 $0.072
Lake Consumers Energy 3.73 $0.110 $0.162 $0.052
Lapeer DTE 3.77 $0.109 $0.133 $0.024
Leelanau Consumers Energy 3.66 $0.112 $0.162 $0.049
Lenawee Consumers Energy 3.84 $0.107 $0.162 $0.054
Livingston DTE 3.81 $0.107 $0.133 $0.026
Luce non-IOU 3.63 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000
Mackinac non-IOU 3.70 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000
Macomb DTE 3.81 $0.107 $0.133 $0.026
Manistee Consumers Energy 3.73 $0.110 $0.162 $0.052
Marquette UPPCo 3.63 $0.113 $0.185 $0.072
Mason Consumers Energy 3.76 $0.109 $0.162 $0.052
Mecosta Consumers Energy 3.74 $0.109 $0.162 $0.052
Menominee UMERC 3.75 $0.109 $0.138 $0.029
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Table 1. Cont.
County Utility Solar Flux(kW/m2/day)
PV LCOE
$/kWh
Residential
Rates $/kWh
PV Savings
$/kWh
Midland Consumers Energy 3.77 $0.109 $0.162 $0.052
Missaukee Consumers Energy 3.69 $0.111 $0.162 $0.051
Monroe DTE 3.85 $0.106 $0.133 $0.027
Montcalm Consumers Energy 3.76 $0.109 $0.162 $0.052
Montmorency Consumers Energy 3.70 $0.111 $0.162 $0.051
Muskegon Consumers Energy 3.78 $0.108 $0.162 $0.054
Newaygo Consumers Energy 3.76 $0.109 $0.162 $0.052
Oakland DTE 3.80 $0.108 $0.133 $0.025
Oceana Consumers Energy 3.77 $0.109 $0.162 $0.052
Ogemaw Consumers Energy 3.75 $0.109 $0.162 $0.052
Ontonagon UPPCo 3.61 $0.113 $0.185 $0.072
Osceola Consumers Energy 3.72 $0.110 $0.162 $0.052
Oscoda Consumers Energy 3.72 $0.110 $0.162 $0.052
Otsego Consumers Energy 3.68 $0.111 $0.162 $0.051
Ottawa Consumers Energy 3.80 $0.108 $0.162 $0.054
Presque Isle Consumers Energy 3.68 $0.111 $0.162 $0.051
Roscommon Consumers Energy 3.73 $0.110 $0.162 $0.052
Saginaw Consumers Energy 3.78 $0.108 $0.162 $0.054
St. Clair DTE 3.66 $0.112 $0.133 $0.021
St. Joseph Consumers Energy 3.80 $0.108 $0.162 $0.054
Sanilac DTE 3.78 $0.108 $0.133 $0.025
Schoolcraft UPPCo 3.82 $0.107 $0.185 $0.078
Shiawassee Consumers Energy 3.74 $0.109 $0.162 $0.052
Tuscola DTE 3.77 $0.109 $0.133 $0.024
Van Buren Consumers Energy 3.81 $0.107 $0.162 $0.054
Washtenaw DTE 3.83 $0.107 $0.133 $0.026
Wayne DTE 3.84 $0.107 $0.133 $0.026
Wexford Consumers Energy 3.70 $0.111 $0.162 $0.051
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2.2. Utility Regulatory Regimes: National, Regional, State, and Local
The current U.S. electrical system is largely comprised of a complex network of centralized
power plants, transmission and distribution infrastructure. Regulatory bodies at the national, regional,
and state levels govern this network. At the national level, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) regulates electricity markets. Broadly, FERC regulates interstate transmission of electricity,
natural gas, and oil [52]. Specifically related to electricity, FERC regulates the rates and services for
interstate electric transmission and electric wholesale power sales by public utilities, transmission
companies, and independent power producers. FERC maintains its legal authority from the Federal
Power Act, which allows the commission to “prescribe, issue, make, amend, and rescind orders, rules,
and regulations” regarding public utility activity [53]. FERC does not have authority over the local
distribution of electric energy, sales of energy to customers, or determining what generation and
transmission is built.
In efforts to increase competition in the wholesale electric marketplace and to provide better
management of multiple independent power supply companies, FERC issued two Orders in 1998 [54],
to introduce Regional Transmission Authorities (RTOs) and Independent System Operators (ISOs).
These regional authorities are responsible for controlling, coordinating, and monitoring operations
across multiple states or within a single state. A key task of RTOs and ISOs is to operate wholesale
electricity markets, allowing for participant utilities to buy and sell electrical power. Ideally, this
system allows for reliable long- and short-term electricity supply for participants and their consumers
at the lowest possible cost. However, electricity in remote communities becomes costly for consumers
based on a centralized model of distribution, as long transmission and distribution lines are necessary
to provide access to these areas. A majority of Michigan’s electricity market is currently under the
purview of the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO), with a small portion participating in
the Pennsylvania, Jersey, Maryland Power Pool (PJM) [55].
State legislatures consider energy matters that are brought forth by the governor or other state
congressional and committee members. They create energy legislation and subsequent laws that PSCs
must comply with and enforce. For example, the Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC) is
required to produce a report [27] to summarize the previous year’s electric utility RE growth. The report
serves two purposes: to ensure that electric utilities comply with RE standards in existing Michigan
energy laws as well as ensure that the MPSC is properly monitoring electric utilities’ utilization of RE
resources. The MPSC compiles data from each electric utility’s reports and presents it to the senate
and house committees on an annual basis.
The MPSC regulates electric utility interconnection, reviews rate cases, and regulates the state’s
renewable energy mandates. Currently, Michigan electric cooperatives [56] and municipal utilities
are allowed to regulate their own electric rates. The 2008 energy law package allowed a pathway
for Michigan’s electric cooperatives to become member regulated [56]. While electric cooperatives
can still choose to be rate regulated by the MPSC, all of them remain unregulated in terms of electric
rates. This allows electric cooperatives to be accountable to their members rather than a governmental
agency [57,58]. The MPSC still regulates electric cooperative interconnection as well as cooperative
and municipal adherence to renewable portfolio standard and energy waste reduction standards.
3. Policy Review
This paper reviews the existing regulations and laws that address DG proliferation at both the
national and state levels. First, Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), the Clean Renewable
and Efficient Energy Act and its amendments, and the Customer Choice and Reliability Act of 2000,
are discussed [25,26,28]. Examples from utility legal and rate cases, in addition to direct firsthand
experiences working with utilities, are provided to illustrate how IOUs in Michigan manipulate
regulation through practices of interpretation and implementation and how these practices limit the
growth of DG.
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Michigan is currently undergoing deliberations regarding net metering, electricity provider choice,
integrated resource planning (IRP) rulemaking, along with annual rate cases [59]. Therefore, this
section provides a timely review of Michigan IOUs’ interpretation and implementation of existing
legislation. Federal and Michigan energy laws are reviewed to provide a foundational understanding
of the environment within which Michigan utilities must operate. The PURPA review provides the
federal legal context through which regulated utilities must buy power from independent power
producers. P.A. 295 [26] describes Michigan’s 2008 energy law that implemented the renewable
energy standard and subsequent net metering program. P.A. 341 [25] and 342 [60] are the recent 2016
amendments to P.A. 295. P.A. 141, 142, and 286 [28] are the energy laws regarding customer choice in
Michigan. This section only reviews the portions of the above laws that are related to DG.
3.1. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), 1978
The Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) was passed in 1978 in response to the 1973
oil shocks. Legislatures hoped to promote generation from alternative energy sources and energy
efficiency, and to diversify the electric industry [61–63]. PURPA requires utilities to buy power from
independent companies or qualified facilities (QF) that can produce power for less than what it would
have cost for the utility to generate the power, called “the avoided cost”. While FERC and state Public
Utility Commissions (PUC) share the enforcement of PURPA, FERC designates the QF, as well as setting
the general regulatory framework. PUCs calculate and set the avoided cost and determine PURPA
contract terms. In order to compromise with contestations against PURPA’s mandatory purchase
obligation, Congress amended PURPA through EPAct 2005. Legislatures found that, as QF have
nondiscriminatory access to wholesale power markets, utilities are no longer obligated to purchase
power from QF with 20+ MW. FERC’s final order keeps the purchase obligation in place, but allows for
utilities to apply for relief from the obligation; QF’s can rebut the application if they are not receiving
nondiscriminatory access. The purchase obligation remains wholly in place with QFs of less than
20MW. FERC can respond to petitions for action by choosing to intervene in state utility operations
during interstate electricity commerce issues or if a ruling is needed during PURPA contestations [64].
PURPA has been instrumental in creating a market for power from non-utility power producers.
This is especially true with DG, as current PURPA avoided cost rates are based on natural gas generation
and the RE costs continue to drop below this [14]. This is due to the interpretation of FERC orders
that utility avoided cost should be based on the cheapest available marginal power (natural gas
combined cycle) [65], whereby DG is competing against a lower avoided cost than the relatively high
cost of coal-fired electricity in antiquated power plants that make up the majority of Michigan’s power
plants [13]. Before PURPA, only utilities could own and operate electric generating plants. However,
recent contestations to PURPA include cuts to contract terms [66], reductions in avoided cost rates [67],
and issues with providing open access to interconnection [68].
The MPSC recently issued a new framework for PURPA contracts in the state. Despite PURPA’s
significance in driving RE development, Michigan utilities met the new framework with strong
resistance. The MPSC recently ordered 20-year contracts at a standard rate for projects that are up to
2MW and a PURPA avoided the cost rate of ~$0.10/kWh [62]; PURPA avoided cost rates had not been
updated in 30 years, which are not reflected in the cost of electricity to consumers, which has increased
by over 50% in 30 years in Michigan [69]. As the new avoided cost rate is favorable ($0.10/kWh),
independent power producers can now secure financing more easily with a 20-year contract term [70].
Michigan utilities simply object to being forced to buy power from PURPA projects, despite the fact
that RE systems provide power at lower costs than the utilities can produce from their less-efficient
power plants [71].
3.2. Clean Renewable and Efficient Energy Act Public Act (P.A.) 295, 2008
In 2008, Michigan enacted Public Act 295, which is also known as Michigan’s Renewable Energy
Standard. P.A. 295 is a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) that required utilities to obtain 10% of
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energy generation from renewables by 2015 (recently increased to 15% by 2021) [26]. Under P.A. 295,
Michigan’s municipal utilities must file a renewable energy plan with the MPSC. Every year following
P.A. 295 enactment, the MPSC is required to submit a report to the Michigan Senate and the House of
Representatives detailing the implementation of P.A. 295.
Under P.A. 295, Michigan regulated utilities are required to provide a net metering program to
DG prosumers [72,73]. This is different from the required interconnection service that was established
under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, as EPAct 2005 amended net metering and interconnection
standards with regards to PURPA [74]. Although this is the law, a recent study has found widespread
inconsistencies in the net metering policies throughout the U.S., within states, and even within
individual companies, with a tiny percentage offering retail rate compensation [75]. P.A. 295 language
states that a minimum of 1% of the utility’s peak generation load could apply and participate in the
net metering program.
The net metering program separated and defined credits for excess energy from DG systems
into three different levels. The first level represented systems up to 20 kW. These systems received
“dollar for dollar” compensation, which is otherwise known as retail credit. The second level included
consumers considering installations between 20 KW and 150 KW. These customers receive less than
retail credit. Finally, the third level comprises DG systems with grid-tied generation of 150 KW
or more [76]. These generators receive zero credit for excess generation under current legislation.
The 2016 amendment, however, allows for 150+ kW methane digesters to receive partial credit (amount
subject to each utility’s discretion) in a modified net metering program. The act also included capacity
requirements for utilities in Michigan that served between 1–2 million retail customers and two million
customers or more. The first designation required these utilities to install 500 MW of renewable
energy capacity by 2015; 600 MW for the second designation. Only two utilities, Consumers Energy
(1.9 million customers) and DTE (1.2 million customers), qualify under these designations.
3.3. P.A. 341
P.A. 341 updated legislation regarding utility rate cases, electric choice, and capacity, and
established an integrated resource planning process. For utility rate cases, P.A. 341 no longer allows for
utilities to institute rate increases if the MPSC has not issued a final order six months after receiving the
rate case. P.A. 341 updates provisions to electric choice, specifically with regards to the reliability and
capacity of alternative suppliers. The alternative suppliers must show that they can meet the energy
needs of their customers. The MPSC is now required to determine the rate that the utility must pay
qualifying facilities for energy generation under PURPA. P.A. 341 creates a process to review avoided
cost rates, which had not been conducted in Michigan since August 27, 1982 [77].
P.A. 341 also requires utilities to create and submit an integrated resource plan (IRP) to the MPSC,
which is a utility roadmap to the provision of least cost service. The roadmap is supposed to assess the
full range of options regarding energy generation and savings to a utility. The IRP must include 5-,
10-, and 15-year projections regarding utility load obligations as well as plans to meet each obligation.
Projections also include utility sales, generation type to satisfy proposed capacity needs, RE purchases,
and eliminated energy waste, among other considerations. Utilities must provide projected rate
impacts that are based on the proposed plan. Once a utility submits an IRP, the MPSC reviews and
can approve, deny, or request revisions from the utility. At the close of 2018, Consumers Energy
Company was the only regulated Michigan utility to have filed an IRP, which has not been approved.
The MPSC and Consumers Energy are currently in settlement negotiations regarding the IRP. Utilities
have varying filing dates and requirements as determined by the MPSC [78].
3.4. Clean and Renewable Energy and Energy Waste Reduction Act, P.A. 342
P.A. 342, passed in 2016, updated RE, energy waste reduction, DG, and on-bill financing laws.
This section focuses on the amendments that are related to RE and DG. First, P.A. 342 increased the RE
requirement for Michigan utilities from 10% by 2015 to 15% by 2025. Utilities are now required to offer
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green pricing programs to retail customers. Language remained from P.A. 295, whereby utilities must
allow a minimum of 1% of peak generation load to participate in the net metering program, yet the
wording allows for an interpretation whereby they can continue to treat this as a limit.
P.A. 342 required the MPSC to create a new DG program; part of this legislation required the
MPSC to conduct a cost of service study to determine an appropriate tariff for DG customers. The DG
program calculates credit for excess energy based on an inflow/outflow methodology. DG customers
will pay for all inflow of electricity delivered by the utility that is based on their regular cost of service
(or retail rate), while the outflow from the solar PV system back to the electrical grid will receive a
credit that is yet to be determined. Two utilities (UPPCo and Detroit Edison) have already submitted
the proposed DG tariffs for MPSC review. Both utilities that have submitted their rate case proposals
to value DG at a wholesale cost [79,80].
3.5. Customer Choice and Reliability Act of 2000; P.A. 141, 142, 286
Until the 1990’s, most U.S. utilities were vertically integrated monopolies that maintained control
over generation, transmission, and distribution of energy. However, states with high electricity
rates reconsidered this structure and then sought ways to lower prices and provide more efficient
utility operations [81]. Broadly, restructuring essentially establishes new legal ground rules for
electricity, generation, and transmission; the exact definition is specific to each aspect of the electricity
industry. In Michigan, restructuring introduced provisions to allow customers to purchase energy
from alternative suppliers, to require regulated utilities to either join a RTO or divest transmission
facilities, to lower residential rates, and to freeze rate increases.
High energy costs and aging electricity infrastructure in the late 1990’s catalyzed the Michigan
legislature to act. The Customer Choice and Reliability Act of 2000 (P.A. 141) amended Public Act
3, 1939, the legislation that directed the regulation of public utilities by the MPSC. The amendment
served to shift Michigan’s electricity industry towards deregulation or restructuring. The legislature
intended to bring competition into electric supply as well as to encourage investment in more efficient
generating capacity. The main component of Michigan’s restructuring involves functional unbundling.
Rather than having generation, transmission, and distribution as one package deal, the services have
been separated into discrete, separately priced components. The Michigan power supply is available
to competitive suppliers, while the transmission and distribution remain under the regulated utilities.
Public Act 142 allowed for incumbent utilities to secure compensation for their costs that are incurred
pre-restructuring that are higher than the costs during competition and in the overall transition to the
competitive market.
Michigan is considered to be a restructured state in that it allows for 100% electric choice in
energy supply. This is misleading, though, as, in 2008, an amendment stipulated that only 10% of a
regulated utility’s retail sales can engage in electric choice (P.A. 286, amendment to P.A. 141). While
Michigan’s choice model states that it allows all consumers the option for electric and gas choice of
suppliers, utilities cap the number of customers that can participate in retail choice opportunities. Even
though the legislative language sets choice at 100%, the reality is that some services are mandatory
(transmission and distribution), while some are subject to choice (supply). Additionally, alternative
suppliers cannot directly provide electricity to each customer contract. This may be due to the
regulatory compact guiding utility and regulator engagement; the MPSC regulates utility rates, while
the utility is guaranteed a service territory [82]. This means that customers do not directly receive
power from an alternative supplier. Some areas where other non-incumbent utilities do not provide
service, the incumbent serves as the default service provider. For example, the Village of L’Anse in
the Upper Peninsula of Michigan is a municipal utility that is located adjacent to territory served by
UPPCo, an IOU. The Village utility electric rates are roughly $0.07–$0.14 lower when compared to
UPPCo, motivating consumers in UPPCo territory to seek out lower rates. For example, an industrial
park that is entirely located within the Village limits contracted services from UPPCo for a limited
timeframe; after this contract closed, the industrial park sought power directly from the Village because
of the cost savings [83]. UPPCo is now currently pursuing litigation against the Village of L’Anse.
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4. Policy Interpretation and Implementation as Utility Driven Manipulation
The history of the electricity industry credits Samuel Insull with the consolidation of utilities
into larger, investor owned, centralized electrical generation stations [84]. Since this time, utilities
have increasingly operated according to the main goal of maximizing profits. Decisions surrounding
how to maximize profits do not usually occur without a precedent or prior experience of the firm or
regulators [85]. Profits and previous experience shaped and explained utility companies’ behaviors
during the first half of the 20th century [86]. However, contemporary IOUs, as examined here in the case
study of Michigan utilities, continue to rely on these considerations to manipulate the interpretation
and implementation of laws in ways that align with business as usual utility operations and cost
recovery goals.
4.1. Rate Cases and the New Inflow/Outflow Methodology
The first way that a public utility can manipulate the law is through proposed rate cases. IOUs
are subject to state regulation by PSCs [82], and the PSCs set prices for different customer types as
well as determining the rate of return on investment for a utility. This is a measure of profitability for
the utility and therefore it is constantly updated with each rate case that a utility proposes. Prior to
Michigan’s 2016 legislation, regulated utilities could self-implement rate increases if the MPSC had not
issued a final order within six months of receiving the rate case.
As stated above, the MPSC recently accepted an inflow/outflow methodology of crediting DG
customers for their excess generation. This means that utilities will use instantaneous metering to read
any electricity that flows into the customer’s home, business, or building as well as excess generation
from the DG system. As per the 2016 energy legislation (section 460.1177), “the credit per kilowatt
hour for kilowatt hours delivered into the utility’s distribution system shall be either of the following:
(a) The monthly average real-time locational marginal price for energy at the commercial pricing
node within the electric utility’s distribution service territory, or for the distributed generation
customers on a time-based rate schedule, the monthly average real-time locational marginal price for
energy at the commercial pricing node within the electric utility’s distribution service territory during
the time-of-use pricing period.
(b) The electric utility’s or alternative electric supplier’s power supply component, excluding
transmission charges, of the full retail rate during the billing period or the time-of-use pricing period.”
Utilities can choose to select one of these two options to credit DG customers. Option (a) utilizes
locational marginal pricing from the MISO Michigan Hub. Utilities that select this option would
essentially credit DG customer outflow at a wholesale rate, or $0.03/kWh (2017 average MISO Michigan
Hub price) [87]. MPSC staff was not aware of any utility selecting this option to credit DG customers
under the current net metering program (Personal communication with MPSC staff on October 31st,
2018.). However, DTE recently submitted their proposed DG tariff [79], in which they propose to credit
customers with the locational marginal pricing, in which power from DG sources is less valued and
it does not reflect DG’s contribution to reducing overall DTE operations costs, capacity, and other
factors that would be considered in a Cost of Service Study, such as avoided transmission, distribution
and voltage control costs [88]. Several studies have shown that DG actually lowers the electric grid
operational costs that are incurred by the utility and they should be valued higher than the proposed
LMP [88]. Accepting an outflow credit at this rate would create a great deterrent in the development
of grid-connected DG systems. Under this model, utilities would be the only grid-connected entity
that is able to take advantage of the economics and benefits from DG. Given the economics of DG solar
in Michigan, this could catalyze grid defection [89] with utility customers choosing to produce their
own power with a hybrid system that is made of up solar, batteries, and gas cogeneration units [11].
This risks creating a utility death spiral [90].
4.2. Legal Maneuvers
Utilities can use litigation strategies, such as maneuvering or stalling, to delay legal proceedings
to change public perception. One specific example is the use of the narrative that DG customers that
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are enrolled in net metering place extra cost burdens on traditional and lower income customers;
put another way, some claim that traditional customers subsidize DG customers [91,92]. For example,
DTE states that DG “customers are not supporting the costs of the infrastructure required for their
service” [93]. However, as shown above, DG can actually reduce the costs for the utility and its
customers [88], yet DTE appears to make the above claim without conducting its own study assessing
the benefits of DG. In response to a cross-examination question regarding analyses on beneficial
impacts of DG on the electrical grid, a DTE witness stated, “we have not performed those studies” [94].
DTE’s proposed DG tariff seeks to reflect the discrepancy between DG and non-DG customers costs.
However, in response to including DG cost assessments in historical or projected figures to justify the
proposed higher costs for DG customers, another DTE employee and witness stated that such evidence
was “not in mine [testimony]” [94].
A second example of IOU tactics to hinder DG is to use lobbying as a way to influence new
legislation or amend existing legislation. Electric utilities fund organizations and committees to elect
governors, state legislators, and attorneys general, who can enact laws and implement rules to support
utility positions. The electric utility industry has the third largest lobbying contribution, spending
roughly $2.4 billion [95]. Utilities have contributed some of the highest amounts of campaign money
this current election cycle [96] as compared to the election cycles from 2010 onward. While utilities
contributions typically lean towards the Republican Party [96], they generally support candidates in
the lead, evenly contributing when elections are competitive [97].
Utilities can also use stalling tactics to buy more time during negotiation periods. This can come
in the form of requesting new information [98], establishing arbitrary timelines [99], or advocating for
the need for additional research before a decision can be made [30]. Utilities can slow legal proceedings
to support a traditional cost recovery model where they own and operate generation [100].
In many states, the prices of utility scale DG have decreased dramatically, matching a utility’s
avoided costs. There has been recent pushback regarding PURPA’s contract lengths, rates, and
other changes, such as the need for capacity. The MPSC recently underwent a process to revise and
redefine the avoided costs of qualifying facilities under PURPA, which had not been done in roughly
30 years. The MPSC revised the PURPA contract length to 20 years and increased the capacity to
2 MW; the previous contract project size was capped at 100 kW [101]. They halted implementations
to work out challenges with utilities. Specifically, the Consumers Energy Company argues that they
should not be required to purchase power from PURPA qualified facilities because they do not need
any new generation in the next 10 years, yet they plan to close two coal fired power plants and
ramp up RE energy generation to 40% and utilize clean energy, meaning both RE systems and energy
efficiency projects [102]. This could be in response to the number of PURPA projects Consumers is
facing (Per personal communication with MPSC staff, Consumers Energy has 2700 MW of potential
contracts in the PURPA queue.). Even if regulators rule against Consumers Energy, this legal maneuver
has the potential to halt any progress or implementation of PURPA projects, as it could take several
months for the MPSC to successfully argue whether Consumers Energy needs capacity.
4.3. Shifting Control
Diversification activity is another response by utilities to maneuver around regulations.
Specifically, utilities can expand their business dealings into loosely regulated arenas [94]. Put another
way, utilities can attempt to shift control away from PSCs. They can do this through implementing
various forms of demand charges, over which PSCs can have little control. They also have discretion
with treating minimum legislative targets as caps and with shifting to fixed charges for energy use.
All of these can function to increase the costs for customers that are interested in installing DG
systems [94], but they can also be detrimental if they do not accurately reflect the costs that are
imposed by DG systems [42]. Instituting arbitrary net metering caps without fully factoring in DG
impacts to cost recovery can lead to further issues and ultimately “under-deployment of distributed
generation” [94]. Shifting control using these price signals inaccurately assigns and misrepresents the
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costs and benefits that are associated with DG, resulting in lower adoption levels. Michigan already
lags in DG installations as compared to the neighboring states of Minnesota (~750 MW [103]) and
Illinois (400 MW by 2030 [104]), both of which employ supportive DG policies [105,106]. Shifting
control away from regulators in this way could function to halt DG development in Michigan.
4.3.1. Demand Charges
Michigan utilities are shifting costs over to demand charges [79,80,107]. This portion of their
rate of return has traditionally only been implemented on large industrial users with high demand.
However, utilities are now moving to implementing various demand equivalent charges on commercial
consumers as well as all types of DG customers (residential, commercial, and industrial). A utility must
maintain enough capacity to satisfy all customers and demand charges cover the cost of supplying
energy at peak times. Typically, commercial and industrial consumers with a large energy demand at
certain times of day face demand charges. Currently, Michigan utilities impose charges on systems that
are above 150 kW, which is known as standby service [31]. Utilities contract standby service to provide
energy supply to DG customers when their system experiences outages. Michigan utilities charge DG
customers when this occurs. DTE included a “System Access Contribution (SAC)” for residential and
commercial DG consumers in its most recent proposed Distributed Generation Tariff [79]. Specifically,
“customers attaching to this rider to residential secondary rate schedules, or to commercial secondary
rate schedules that do not have delivery demand charges, shall be subject to the SAC charge.” This is
essentially a demand charge that is imposed onto residential and commercial consumers who do not
typically require the same amount of demand when compared to larger industrial consumers.
4.3.2. Utility Discretion with Net Metering “Caps”
The original P.A. 295 legislation included a minimum peak load percentage who could participate
in net metering. “An electric utility or alternative electric supplier is not required to allow for net
metering greater than 1% of its in-state peak load for the preceding calendar year.” In 2016, the
legislature amended this to include a five-year average: “An electric utility or alternative electric
supplier is not required to allow for a distributed generation program that is greater than 1% of its
average in-state peak load for the preceding 5 calendar years.”
First, the limit that is discussed in this legislation is at the discretion of the utility. UPPCo was the
first Michigan utility to reach the 1% minimum [108], as the peak generation load is much smaller when
compared to other Michigan utilities. The UPPCo service area struggles economically and consumers
pay some of the highest base electricity rates in the nation, sometimes amounting to >$0.25/kWh [109].
According to UPPCo’s CEO, rates are high due to the rural nature and sparse population of UPPCo’s
service territory [109]. This can contribute to reliability and vulnerability issues during harsh winter
months in the UP. UPPCo is also the incumbent utility in the Western Upper Peninsula region. Because
of the 10% cap on choice that is used by large institutions, no alternative power suppliers are available
to allow for residents to seek alternative power supply at lower rates. Alongside this, IOUs are for
profit entities that must bring money back to their shareholders. Municipalities, such as the Village
of L’Anse discussed above, have lower electricity rate prices due to their non-profit designation.
Additionally, they participate in member ownership of a power supply company with many different
municipalities to offer more competitive pricing to their customers.
In P.A. 295, the 1% was calculated based on a one-year average, whereas the 2016 amendment is
calculated based on a five-year average. A second amendment to P.A. 295 limits which technology can
participate in the new DG program. Specifically, only methane digesters that are above 150 kW can
participate in the DG program. The MPSC conducted a cost of service study to determine a fair and
reasonable rate for DG customers; however, a full study is still needed, as this study only analyzed
the inflow pricing effects. In this cost of service study, MPSC staff found that DG customers were
overcharged roughly $106/year [29]. Once the MPSC conducts a full study, and the fair and reasonable
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rate is determined, it will arguably no longer make sense to set a limit on the number of customers or
the type of technology that can participate in the DG program.
4.3.3. Utility Shifting from Rate to Monthly Charges
Typically, utilities charge customers in two ways: a fixed charge ($/month) and an electric rate
based on electric consumption ($/kWh). The fixed charge usually comes in the form of a “system
access” fee (or equivalent) for monthly connection to the utility’s electricity infrastructure. This allows
for the utility to recover some of the costs that come with serving a customer, regardless of whether
they use electricity or not. However, electricity demand has been plateauing, requiring utilities to
seek alternative ways to continue profiting from cost recovery mechanisms [110–112]. Some examples
across the U.S. include transferring distribution charges to fixed charges and including equipment
costs in the time of use rate schedules [113]. A Michigan example can be found in DTE’s most recent
rate case [79]. DTE proposed two pilot programs, the Weekend Flex Pilot and the Fixed Bill Pilot. These
pilots propose two different types of fixed charges on a weekend and monthly basis for electricity
consumption. Customers pay a fixed charge, regardless of their actual electricity consumption. This
can provide incentive for customers to use more electricity [114], as well as discouraging the use of
customer-owned DG and allowing DTE opportunities to maximize profits without providing a direct
benefit to consumers.
4.4. Modeling in Cost of Service Studies
Finally, utilities can alter the regulatory process through choice of modeling scenarios. Michigan
energy legislation requires utilities to forecast and issue a plan for generation and capacity needs several
years into the future. Utilities use cost benefit analysis (CBA), risk analysis, and scenario comparisons
to determine their trajectory. Utilities also use CBA to assess the impacts that are associated with
infrastructure investments. These analyses can help to determine which projects a utility should
pursue, how to recover costs, what technologies to invest in, etc. Utilities manipulate modeling
scenarios by choosing which factors to include in an assessment.
Specifically, many Michigan utilities create scenarios to maintain their control of generation.
Consumers Energy Company used modeling with assumptions such as market prices, future energy
demand, and varying levels of clean energy resources to determine the best strategy to meet customer’s
needs [102]. As a result of the declining costs of RE, Consumers Energy plans to focus on RE
generation through Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), alongside energy efficiency measures and
demand response strategies. These strategies allow Consumers Energy to maintain all control over
generation resources. With regard to utility scale RE generation, Consumers Energy proposed a
financial compensation mechanism that would allow them to continue profiting from generation in
the PPA as if they owned the asset [102].
Additionally, Detroit Edison (DTE) conducted a CBA and risk analysis in preparation for
their proposed IRP. The CBA includes assumptions that heavily weight generation without time
of generation being considered (Information obtained from personal attendance at DTE IRP workshop
on November 12th 2018). DTE chose to include factors and assumptions in their methodology that
resulted in increased costs associated with more RE generation [114]. This allows for them to implement
demand response programs, conservation voltage reduction, and additional demand charges without
considering options to help in demand reduction that actually decrease the total or peak load.
5. Policy Implications and Recommendations
This review of existing regulations and laws regarding DG installations in Michigan finds that
utilities interpret and implement legislation in ways that can be detrimental to DG proliferation.
This section will use specific examples regarding how utilities interpret these laws to inform policy
recommendations to assist decision makers to support an energy transition with DG. Specific
recommendations include the removal of net metering caps, support for time of use rates, electric
choice, annual avoided cost calculations, transparent bookkeeping, and municipalization.
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5.1. Net Metering Cap Removal
The December 2016 energy laws P.A. 341 and 342 maintain language that allows utilities to
keep the net metering capacity at 1%. Utilities rely on the narrative that traditional utility customers
subsidize net metering customers to prevent any further net metering DG proliferation. The 2016
legislation required the MPSC to conduct a cost of service study to place a value on distributed
generation for the inflow/outflow model [25]. The MPSC cost of service report concluded the
opposite—that DG customers subsidize all other utility customers [29]. This is consistent with other
studies [41,42,115,116] that DG customers provide a net benefit not only to non-DG customers but
also to the overall electrical grid [42]. If the MPSC value is considered to be a fair and reasonable
value, per utility ratemaking, there should be no need to place a cap on net metering. Additionally,
most values of solar studies conclude that net metering programs undervalue solar [42], which also
provides support for the removal of a net metering cap. State legislation such as in Massachusetts [117]
and South Carolina [118] recently failed to lift caps on net metering capacity, arguably to the utility’s
benefits to halt DG growth. A policy change could lift the cap, allowing for increased DG proliferation
in Michigan for the benefit of all electricity customers.
5.2. Support for Time-of-Use Rates
Both DTE and UPPCo’s recently submitted DG Tariff Rate Case proposed charging residential DG
customers demand charges, a charge that usually falls upon heavy end users such as industrial
or commercial consumers. This demand charge is reflective of the traditional utility goal: cost
recovery. However, cost recovery does not provide any information regarding the real cost of
electricity. Regulators and policymakers could turn to a commonly used rate design that attends
to other objectives, such as transparency, peak and overall load reduction, and customer awareness.
Time-of-use rates can be used to properly compensate for DG, as they more accurately reflect the
electricity cost variations [119]. Additionally, time-of-use rates can help to change customer’s behavior
to actually reduce demand and overall usage [120]. Pennsylvania’s time-of-use rate pilot saw success in
reducing peak load demand along with saving customer’s money, especially in senior and low-income
populations [121]. After the tweaking and massaging of their time-of-use program, a south Mississippi
utility’s customers began to see significant savings, both on an individual level and a consumer type
level [122]. While Michigan utilities do offer time-of-use rates, utilities such as Consumers Energy
place a focus on strategies such as demand response and conservation voltage reduction to maintain
control over energy supply and demand. Utilizing a time-of-use rate can help reduce utility costs by
preventing the ramp up of additional generation and satisfying legislation to support energy efficiency
and decrease use while allowing for continued support and proliferation of DG.
5.3. Electric Choice
Michigan’s electric choice legislation caps the capacity to participate in choice at 10%. This
excludes residential and commercial consumers from participating, as the larger industrial consumers
demand more power that is more favorable to the utility, as they sell larger amounts of power to one
customer in addition to implementing demand charges to the large users. Stating that individuals,
for example, in the Upper Peninsula, have the freedom to choose their electric suppliers, however,
does not mean that they will actually be able to voluntarily choose an alternative electric supplier. This
is because they do not have an alternative to choose from. While these customers are “free to choose,”
they are unable to due to the lack of alternatives [123] unless they actually opt to grid defect. Ultimately,
utility consumer choices will be considered to be voluntary when they make these choices on the
basis that there are viable alternatives; not having an alternative choice preempts an ability to choose
from multiple electric suppliers. As larger industrial and commercial consumers are able to choose
their alternative supplier, the 10% cap is swiftly used, leaving no electric choice options for smaller
residential consumers or small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Policy recommendation to fix
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this oversight include considering incremental increases to the electric choice structure in Michigan.
Michigan schools’ energy usage come to roughly 1% of Michigan’s energy load. Legislation could
be changed to target different sectors, providing them with an opportunity for choice. This steady
increase would come at greater ease when compared to a drastic increase in choice, which proved
disastrous in other states [124–126].
5.4. Annual Avoided Cost Calculations
PURPA-based contracts remain critically important in diversifying electrical generation while
decreasing generation costs. Non-utility power producers also provide more jobs in more diverse
locations than utility projects [127,128]. Utilities argue that long stable contracts for power increase
power rates, but that is simply not true, especially if the MPSC conducts more frequent cost of service
studies to accurately reflect the avoided costs. Utility companies such as Consumers Energy argue that
they do not need capacity from PURPA contracts, yet Consumers Energy plans to close two coal-fired
power plants [102].
The PURPA rate was established by the MPSC using a “cost of service” study that results in a
lower cost for the utilities to operate and, though conditions might change in the future, those stable
contracts will, by nature, produce capacity and energy at a lower cost than the utility themselves
would have created them. Alongside this, the cost of service studies should be annually conducted for
each type to accurately reflect fuel costs and appropriately assign avoided rate costs.
5.5. Transparent Bookkeeping
The regulatory compact that exists between a government and utility guarantees a service territory
to the utility. This ensures that the utility does not have competition with other energy providers.
Increasingly, utilities view DG customers as another form of competition [129,130]. If regulators
and utilities want to maintain an energy system by continuing this monopoly, transparency should
be in place for regulators to assist utilities in making better decisions regarding energy generation,
transmission, and distribution. Regulated utilities are guaranteed a 10% rate of return [50] on energy
infrastructure investments. This is guaranteed on top of electric utility executive compensation that
reaches into the millions of dollars per year and it is currently not structured to maximize benefit
for customers or the greater society [131]. Utilities that wish to operate in a minimally competitive
environment should provide full transparency of their bookkeeping. This would allow the state to see
exactly how money is being spent and where it is allocated. This could translate into more informed
financial models to better serve the utility customer base.
5.6. Municipalization
In Michigan, IOUs must comply with policies and laws regarding DG proliferation. Electric
cooperatives and municipalities have an obligation to their customers rather than strictly to
shareholders. As a result, they have flexibility in offering DG programs to satisfy their customers.
One route for cities that currently receive power from a regulated utility is to municipalize. With respect
to electricity, municipalization is a transfer of electric service from an IOU to municipal ownership
and service [132]. This can allow the municipality to lower the electricity rates [133] through member
ownership of energy supply (e.g.). Additionally, they can explore DG programs and opportunities
that are currently unexplored in existing IOU territories. In 2010, Boulder, Colorado began the
process of exploring municipalization as an option to reach their clean energy goals. The process
of municipalization typically involves an initial feasibility study and subsequent decision-making.
Every state varies in the regulatory and legal channels that are required to municipalize. Michigan
law allows cities to municipalize to provide electricity [134,135], among other services; however,
the price of facility infrastructure is typically determined through an agreement with the IOU [82].
The municipalization process can take time (10+ years for Boulder, Colorado [136]), but can also allow
cities more control over what DG programs they offer to customers.
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6. Conclusions
A recent study has noted that 42% of the world’s coal plants are currently operating at a loss and
that the proportion is estimated to rise to ~ 75% by 2040 [137]. In the U.S., 70% of coal plants run at
a higher cost than new RE and by 2030 all of them will [137]. Thus there is a clear need, not only in
Michigan but throughout the rest of the U.S. and the world, to move away from coal technology as
rapidly as possible on economic grounds alone. While RE DG has the potential to provide reliable
electricity that benefits consumers and electrical grid, Michigan’s DG proliferation remains low in
favor of antiquated coal pants. This study reviewed existing energy policies and laws with respect to
DG to obtain a sense of institutional support surrounding the continued use of coal or RE DG. PURPA
contestations have placed a hold on the release of several hundred to thousand MW contracts of DG.
Recent legislation has sparked deliberations in Michigan’s RE rulemaking. Similarly, net metering and
electric choice caps prevent customers from seeking energy from renewable sources. The results of
this study clearly show that DG proliferation is hindered by Michigan regulated utilities exercising
political power within the existing legal and regulatory regimes.
This review highlights the need to think about how utilities interpret and implement rules for
developing legislation and policies to better suit the needs of consumers. Specifically, Michigan
utilities hinder DG proliferation through rate cases, legal maneuvers, shifting control from regulators,
and selective modeling in the cost of service studies. Utilities can propose little compensation as well
as added fees on DG customers, making DG customers’ investment in RE technologies unattractive.
To prevent headway in building systems under PURPA contracts, utilities utilize legal maneuvers
to slow or even halt the process. Utilities can attempt to shift control away from regulators by
implementing demand equivalent charges on DG customers, instituting caps on program participation,
and shifting to fixed charges for a customer’s energy use. Finally, utilities can conduct biased cost of
service studies by including factors that provide little support for DG system adoption.
There are several policy recommendations that can support higher DG proliferation in Michigan
that are relevant to other states and regions in the rest of the world. If an appropriate cost of service
study finds fair and reasonable compensation for net metering customers, then the Michigan legislature
should increase the minimum requirement in net metering programs. Michigan utilities can place
increased emphasis on time of use rates to accurately reflect electricity cost variations and help to
determine appropriate DG compensation. The cap on electric choice should be increased to allow
for more participation from non-industrial consumers. Annual avoided cost calculations can help
in reflecting fuel costs to appropriately compensate for PURPA contracts. More broadly, regulated
utilities that wish to remain a natural monopoly should utilize transparent bookkeeping to allow
for state legislatures and regulators to monitor spending to determine the best way to serve a utility
customer base. Finally, cities that set clean energy goals can explore municipalization if the incumbent
utility is reluctant to support satisfying these goals through DG proliferation. Just as there are several
strategies that Michigan utilities use to prevent the large proliferation of DG systems, this study has
shown there are several strategies to explore shifting existing legal and regulatory regimes towards the
support of DG proliferation.
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